NEDAC: A worm countermeasure mechanism by Ahmad, M.A. et al.




NEDAC: A Worm Countermeasure Mechanism 
NEDAC: A WORM COUNTERMEASURE MECHANISM 
  
*1 Muhammad Aminu Ahmad , 1Abubakar S. Magaji and 1Sani Dari 
1Department of Mathematical Sciences, Faculty of Science, 
Kaduna State University, Kaduna, Nigeria. 
 
*Corresponding Author’s Email: muhdaminu@kasu.edu.ng 
 
ABSTRACT  
This article presents an Internet worm countermeasure 
mechanism that uses DNS activities as a behavioural technique 
to detect worm propagation. The mechanism also uses a data-link 
containment solution to block traffic from an infected host. The 
concept has been demonstrated using a developed prototype and 
tested in a virtualised network environment. An empirical analysis 
of network worm propagation has been conducted to test the 
capabilities of the developed countermeasure mechanism. The 
results show that the developed mechanism is sensitive in 
containing Internet worms.    
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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has provided a medium for communication and 
sharing of information amongst people, businesses, governments 
and organisations. As a result, the Internet services must be kept 
continuous and secured from network and malware attacks. 
Malicious software (malware) is a generic term for any software 
that enters a computer system without the authorisation of the 
user to perform unwanted actions (Niemelä & Palomäki, 2013). 
Malware can be classified under a number of headings, including 
viruses, worms, trojans, spyware, adware, rootkits, drive-by 
downloads and other malicious and unwanted software. Self-
propagating malware (termed a worm) is a particular class of 
malware that is highly virulent due to its self-spreading features. 
Fast scanning worms are particularly dangerous class of worms 
that self-propagate very rapid without the need for human 
interaction, particularly zero-day fast scanning worm that use a 
vulnerability that has not been patched or widely acknowledged at 
the point of an outbreak (Tidy et al., 2014). Internet worm 
outbreaks (e.g. Slammer, Code Red and Witty (Joukov & Chiueh, 
2003)) have been experienced on the Internet, which caused 
disruption of services and significant financial losses to 
government, transportation and other institutions. Outbreaks of 
effective fast Internet worms can cause significant damage that 
involve financial losses ranging from millions to billions of US 
Dollars: $US2.6Bn for Code Red, $US1.2Bn for Slammer and 
circa $US11M for Witty (Fosnock, 2005). 
A vulnerability can be exploited by a worm if it is network 
reachable, provides remote code execution, provides network 
access, and does not require human interaction once exploited 
(Tidy et al., 2014). Individual vulnerabilities can be researched 
through a number of online sources that provide details of 
identified vulnerabilities such as the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) (CVE, 2014) and National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) (NVD, 2014) systems. These sources published 
vulnerabilities including the Microsoft RDP vulnerability (CVE-
2012-0002) of 2012, and the ShellShock (CVE-2014-6271) and 
Drupal (CVE-2014-3704) vulnerabilities of 2014. Thus, the 
present threat of worm event remains clear. 
A range of behavioural detection and suppression mechanisms 
has been reported in previously published security research work. 
However, there are limitations and shortcomings in the reported 
mechanisms. These involve ineffectiveness in detecting worms 
(Jyothsna et al., 2011), resource consumption, delay in 
deployment and detection (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009), 
management overhead and computational complexity, and in 
most cases the techniques only slow worm infections (Li et al., 
2008). The previously reported research work can be categorized 
into signature-based and anomaly-based detection systems. The 
signature-based detection system maintains a database of 
signatures for previously known attacks and raises an alarm if a 
datagram in the network matches a signature in the database. 
Anomaly-based detection systems examine network traffic in 
order to build a profile of the normal behaviour and then raise an 
alarm for events that deviate from the normal profile. In contrast to 
signature-based systems, anomaly-based systems can detect 
new attacks and therefore capable of detecting zero-day worms. 
The focus of this article is to present an anomaly-based detection 
scheme that uses datagram-header information to identify the 
presence of a worm. 
The remainder of the article is presented as follows. Section 2 
presents related work on worm detection and containment 
systems. Section 3 presents the description of the developed 
countermeasure mechanism. Section 4 presents the experimental 
evaluation of the reported mechanism using a developed 
prototype. Section 5 discusses the results of the evaluation 
experiments conducted and Section 6 concludes the paper and 
discusses possible future work. 
Related Work 
A number of detection techniques were reported that identify the 
presence of a worm using datagram header information (Smith et 
al., 2009). Among these approaches are those that monitor 
source and destination IP addresses of datagrams, such as the 
work reported by Williamson (2002). Williamson (2002) proposed 
a detection and suppression technique that uses the source and 
destination IP addresses of a host making a request to detect an 
attack. The technique delays request from a host if it is new, 
otherwise it will be processed as normal. However, many fast 
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requests to randomly-generated IP addresses, which results in a 
number of failed connections. As a result, some approaches used 
the status of connection requests to detect worm behaviour such 
as the work of Jung et al. (2004), Weaver et al. (2004) and 
Rasheed et al. (2009). This technique uses the count of 
successful and failed connection attempts to determine the 
presence of worm scanning. Additionally, Gu et al. (2004) used a 
technique that correlates source and destination IP addresses 
and source and destination ports to detect fast scanning worms. 
The technique uses an algorithm termed Destination Source 
Correlation (DSC) that keeps track of SYN datagrams and UDP 
traffic of the source and destination. Thus, if a host received a 
datagram on port i, and then starts sending datagrams destined 
for port i, it becomes a suspect. Then if the immediate outgoing 
scan rate for the suspect host deviates from a normal profile, the 
host is considered to be infected. 
Another detection approach is the use of DNS activities of hosts 
to detect worm propagation. Whyte et al. (2005) and Shahzad & 
Woodhead (2014a) used DNS-based rate limiting to suppress fast 
scanning Internet worms in an enterprise network. The 
observation was scanning worms often use numeric IP addresses 
instead of the qualified domain name of a system, which 
eliminates the need for a DNS query. In contrast, the vast majority 
of legitimate publicly available services are accessed through the 
use of DNS protocol; the network service that maps numeric IP 
addresses to corresponding alphanumeric names. Therefore the 
main idea behind this technique is that the absence of DNS 
resolution before a new connection is considered anomalous. 
This notion was first proposed by Ganger et al. (2002), and if is 
implemented properly, it will impose severe limitations on worm 
traffic. This forces scanning worms to either probe DNS 
namespace or issue a DNS query for each IP address, which 
significantly reduces the speed of worm propagation (Wong et al., 
2006). Thus, it is desirable to further explore the use of DNS 
activities for the detection of scanning worms 
Worm Detection and Containment  
The proposed detection and containment mechanism, termed 
NEDAC (Network Detection and Data-link Containment), uses the 
absence of DNS query prior to contacting new destinations by a 
hosts. Many fast scanning worms generate pseudo-random IP 
addresses and attempt to make contact to find susceptible hosts. 
This behaviour obviates the need for DNS lookup, which is 
abnormal for the vast majority of legitimate publicly available 
services and is therefore a tell-tale sign of scanning worm 
propagation (Ganger et al., 2002). 
 
The NEDAC mechanism consists of two main sub-systems that 
work together to provide a countermeasure solution. The first 
system is the network layer detection system and the second 
system is the data link layer containment system, with a 
connection maintained between the two components to enable 
continuous data transmission. Fig. 1 shows the flow diagram of 
the network layer detection system and Fig. 2 shows the flow 
diagram of the containment system 
 
 
Fig. 1: Detection system 
 
 




This section presents an evaluation of the NEDAC mechanism. 
Initially, a description of the methodology used to evaluate 
NEDAC using developed worm outbreak scenarios was 
presented. Then the section presents the parameters used for the 
worm outbreak scenarios and the experimental results obtained 
To develop and use a worm in experiment, some important metric 
are required such the susceptible population of the worm under 
study, the worm datagram size and scan rates. Slammer worm is 
the fastest spreading worm experienced on the Internet (Moore et 
al., 2003). Moore et al. (2003) reported that Slammer worm had a 
susceptible population of 75,000 hosts and spread without 
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NEDAC: A Worm Countermeasure Mechanism 
average scan rate of 4000 datagrams per infected host per 
second and had a datagram size of 404 bytes. Thus, these 
metrics were used to develop a pseudo-Slammer worm outbreak 
scenario. Based on the susceptible population value of the 
Slammer worm along with the size of routable IPv4 address 
space (3,673,309,759 (Cotton & Vegoda, 2010)), the number of 








The NEDAC mechanism has been implemented as a software 
prototype using the C programming language. The prototype was 
deployed and tested in a virtualised network testbed reported by 
Ahmad & Woodhead (2015). The detection system was installed 
on the gateway of each network and the containment system on 
the virtual switches in the testbed. Fig. 3 depicts the deployment 
of the detection and containment systems across of local network 
across two enterprise networks. 
 
The pseudo-Slammer worm propagation was experimented using 
a worm daemon (Shahzad & Woodhead, 2014b) that has been 
developed with the capabilities of facilitating a worm attack event 
using chosen worm characteristics. The worm daemon system 
consists of both client and server modules capable of sending and 
receiving UDP datagrams. The client module is used to initiate a 
worm attack against the desired targets. The hosts were made 
susceptible to attack by running the server module, which listens 
on a specific UDP port and then, after receiving an “infection” 
datagram, continuously transmits “infectious” UDP datagrams. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Virtual environment for countermeasure testing 
 
Upon infection, a susceptible host will send its time stamp and IP 
address information to the logging server for record management. 
The logging server has been configured with a logging daemon 
that keeps the details of infected host addresses and infection 
time. This process continues until full infection is achieved based 
on the details recorded on the logging server. The worm infection 
event was initiated by sending a UDP datagram to one of the 
susceptible hosts. A UDP-based worm has been chosen due to 
its higher rate of propagation compared to a TCP-based 
counterpart. UDP-based worms require no acknowledgement and 
cannot be detected by mechanisms that rely on number or state 
of failed connection attempts. 
 
Experiments 
The pseudo-Slammer experiment was conducted using 21 
susceptible hosts per million Internet hosts in three class A size 
networks, and therefore contained [224 ∗ 3 ∗
21
1,000,000
] = 1057 
susceptible hosts. The pseudo-Slammer worm daemon was 
configured to listen on UDP port 1434 and then randomly 
transmits UDP datagrams to port 1434 at a scan rate of 125 
“infectious” datagrams per second, once “infected”. The scan rate 
was scaled down to 32% in order to avoid overloading server 
resources. 
 
Five experiments were conducted using one initially infected host 
without any countermeasure in place. Fig. 4 shows the average 
result of the five experiments. The experiments were repeated 
with NEDAC mechanism in place using a range of threshold 
values of 100, 200, 400 and 500 distinct IP addresses contacted 
without prior DNS lookup. NEDAC was configured to invoke the 
containment system if a threshold is exceeded within time 
duration of 10 seconds. The worm infection was detected and 
contained by the NEDAC mechanism with no further infection 
across the entire range of NEDAC experiments conducted. 
 
Further experiments were conducted with a hit-list (Staniford et 
al., 2002) of 10 and 20 hosts. In hit-list worm propagation, a pre-
compiled list of susceptible hosts is used to initialize the infection. 
Then each infected host randomly transmits infection datagrams. 
The hit-list behaviour was tested using threshold values of 100, 
200, 400 and 500, and a time duration of 10 seconds. The worm 
propagation was also detected and contained with no further 
infection for the hit-list of 10 and 20 hosts. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show 
the results of worm propagation using a hit-list of 20 hosts with 
and without the NEDAC mechanism 
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Fig. 5: Hit-list infection behaviour using 10 hosts 
 
 
Fig. 6: Hit-list infection behaviour using 20 hosts 
 
DISCUSSION 
The experimental result for random infection without 
countermeasure shows that the worm attained 99% infection in 55 
minutes as presented in Fig. 4. Thus using 4000 scans per 
second, the susceptible population of 1057 hosts could be 
infected in [55 ∗ (
32
100
)] = 18 minutes, which is close to the 
infection time of Slammer (15 minutes) as reported by Moore et 
al. (2003). However, when the NEDAC mechanism was in place, 
the initially infected host was detected and contained before 
spreading the infection. This is achieved due to the containment 
solution used at the data-link layer to block all outbound 
datagrams from an identified infected host. 
 
Furthermore, the result of hit-list experiment with 10 hosts shows 
that the worm attained 99% infection without countermeasure in 
34 minutes as shown in Fig. 5. The infection time further reduced 
to 25 minutes with a hit-list of 20 hosts as shown in Fig. 6. In both 
hit-list scenarios, reduction in the times of infection were observed 
due to the increase in number of contacts made per second, i.e., 
10 ∗  125 =  1250 and 20 ∗ 125 =  2500  “infectious” 
datagrams for the hit-list of 10 and 20 hosts respectively. Despite 
the increased number of contacts per second, NEDAC was able 
to detect and contain the initially infected population of 10 and 20 
hosts before spreading the infection. This was achieved due to 
the containment solution used at the data-link layer to isolate all 
outbound datagrams from an identified infected host. 
 
Generally, the NEDAC mechanism has demonstrated 
effectiveness in detecting and containing fast scanning Internet 
worms at an early stage. 
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
This article has presented a mechanism that uses DNS activities 
to detect anomalies at network layer and employs a data-link 
layer containment system to isolate an infected host. The 
empirical results of the experiments conducted showed that the 
mechanism can detect and completely contain fast scanning 
Internet worms including hit-list worm propagation scenario. This 
is due to the containment techniques employed in the data link 
layer that isolates a given infected host from the network and 
therefore ends the worm propagation.  
 
As future work, it is desirable to further optimise the mechanism, 
particularly the detection scheme. The mechanism will further be 
evaluated using background traffic to test the effects of false 
alarms. The complexity of the detection system will be evaluated 
and then a comparative evaluation of the mechanism with existing 
worm detection techniques will be conducted. 
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